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2. That the transaction was not intended as a preference; and the filing of the contract within four months of the date when Bisenius was adjudged a bankrupt, though signed and executed long prior thereto, did not render it such within the meaning of the bankruptcy act.

3. That the title to the property never became vested in Bisenius, and by no act of his did the plaintiff obtain a preference over his creditors.

4. That the provision of the bankruptcy act declaring that, where a preference consists in a transfer of property, the period of four months shall not expire until four months after recording or registering the same, refers to transfers originally intended as preferences, or which at their inception constituted such as a matter of law. *Bradley, Clark & Co. v. Benson* (Minn.), 2670.

BANKRUPTCY—FEES OF REFEREE—EXTRA ALLOWANCES—Under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418], as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, 32 Stat. 797 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1903, p. 409], the only allowance which can be made to a referee in addition to the fees and commission expressly prescribed therein is for expenses necessarily incurred, a detailed account of which must be kept and returned to the court, verified by the oath of the referee, and accompanied by vouchers when they can be procured. *In Re Daniels* (District Ct., N. D. Iowa), 130 Fed. 597.

BANKRUPTCY—CLAIMS OF ATTORNEYS—ALLOWANCE—Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, sec. 60d, 30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3446], provides that if a debtor shall, directly or indirectly, in contemplation of bankruptcy, pay money or transfer property to an attorney, solicitor in equity, or proctor in admiralty, for services to be rendered, the transaction shall be examined by the court on petition of the trustee for creditors, and shall only be valid to the extent of a reasonable amount, to be determined by the court, and the excess may be recovered by the trustee for the benefit of the estate. Section 64b, 30 Stat. 563 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447], provides for an allowance for attorney's services rendered to the bankrupt in assisting him while performing the duties imposed by the act. Held, that section 60d was limited to the allowance of reasonable compensation to attorneys for services rendered to the bankrupt prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, and did not cover services rendered in resisting the creditor's petition for an adjudication of bankruptcy. *Pratt v. Bothe* (C. C. A., Sixth Circuit), 130 Fed. 670.

BANKRUPTCY—JURISDICTION OF COURT TO MAKE ADJUDICATION—POSSESSION OF PROPERTY BY RECEIVERS—The fact that the property of a corporation is in the possession of receivers appointed by a state court does not affect the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy to adjudicate such corporation a bankrupt. *In Re C. Moench & Sons Co.* (C. C. A., Second Circuit), 130 Fed. 685.